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Abstract:
Purpose: In forest insurance market, there are three main participants including the insurance
company, the forest farmer and the government. As different participant has different benefit
object,  there will  be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all  participants. The
purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  make  the  game  relationship  among  all  participants  in  forest
insurance  market  clear,  and  then  to  put  forward  some  policy  suggestions  on  the
implementation of  forest insurance from the view of  game theory.
Design/methodology/approach: Firstly,  the  static  game  model  between  the  insurance
company and the forest farmer is set up. According to the result of  static game model, it’s
difficult to implement forest insurance without government. Secondly, the tripartite dynamic
game model among the government, the insurance company and the forest farmer is proposed,
and  the  equilibrium  solution  of  tripartite  dynamic  game  model  is  acquired.  Finally,  the
behavioral characteristics of  all participants are analyzed according to the equilibrium solution
of  tripartite dynamic game model. 
Findings:  The government’s  allowance  will  be  an important  positive  factor  to  implement
forest  insurance.  The loss  of  the  insurance company,  which  the  lower  insurance premium
brings, can be compensated by the allowance from the government. The more the government
provides allowance, the more actively the insurance company will implement forest insurance at
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a low insurance premium. In this situation, the forest farmer will be more likely to purchase the
forest insurance, then the scope of  forest insurance implementation will expend.
Originality/value: There is a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants
in forest insurance market. Based on the tripartite dynamic game model, to make the game
relationship  between  each  participant  clear  is  conducive  to  the  implementation  of  forest
insurance market in China.
Keywords: forest insurance, insurance company, forest farmer, government
1. Introduction
Forests  provide ecological,  economic,  social  and aesthetic  services to  natural  systems and
humankind (Bonan, 2008). Forests and their changes are important to the regional and global
carbon cycle,  biodiversity  and ecosystem services  (Qin  et  al.,  2015).  Forest  production  is
important for the supply of forest products needed both locally and globally, and a substantial
portion of the population of the world depends on forest products for energy, construction
material and paper (Nzunda, 2012). For example, wood fuel accounts for about 7% of the total
energy supply in the world and in Africa 91% of energy used comes from wood fuel, which is
one important form of forest products (FAO, 1999). Furthermore wood is the only renewable
resource  widely  and economically  suitable  for  structural  and  architectural  purposes  (Koch,
1992).
However, throughout the long production cycle, forests may be destroyed by various natural
disasters such as fires, hurricanes, blizzards, earthquakes, floods, and droughts. Compared
with other countries, there are more frequent occurrences of natural disasters in China (Dai,
Chang & Liu, 2015). According to the data released by State Forestry Administration of China,
during the last 12 years between 2002 and 2013, there were 104,599 fire disasters affecting
1,351,248 hectares forest area, and the area affected by disease, insect and rat pest was
129,856 thousand hectares. These forest disasters have caused a huge financial loss of forest
industry in China. It is shown as Table 1.
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Year Forest firetimes
Forest fire area
(hectare)
Forest Disease, Insect and Rat Pest
(thousand hectares)
2002 7,527 47,631 8,412
2003 10,463 451,020 8,887
2004 13,466 142,238 9,448
2005 11,542 73,701 9,844
2006 8,170 408,255 11,007
2007 9,260 29,286 12,097
2008 14,144 52,539 11,418
2009 8,859 46,156 11,420
2010 7,723 45,800 11,642
2011 5,550 26,950 11,681
2012 3,966 13,948 11,769
2013 3,929 13,724 12,230
Table 1. Forest disaster situation in China from 2002 to 2013
Disaster  insurance  program  can  be  seen  as  an  important  risk  management  strategy  for
insurants  to  cope  with  uncertain  risky  environments.  Forest  insurance  program  can  be
considered as  an effective  risk-sharing  policy  tool  to  reduce  the  burden of  risk  for  forest
farmers. Compared with the developed countries, there will  be a large potential  for forest
insurance in China due to the high frequency of natural disasters.
According to the report from State Forestry Administration of China (2012), in China more than
60% of the annual per capita income came from the forest production in major forest zones in
2010. Forest production is an important source of household income in these rural mountain
areas. In order to resist forest natural disasters, experiments on forest insurance have been
implemented in 17 provinces in China by 2012, including Fujian, Jiangxi,  Hunan, Liaoning,
Zhejiang,  Yunnan,  Guangdong,  Guangxi,  Sichuan,  Hebei,  Anhui,  Henan,  Hubei,  Hainan,
Chongqing, Guizhou and Shanxi. As the scope of experiments on forest insurance enlarged, the
role  of  forest  insurance is  fairly defined.  However,  there are  still  many problems in forest
insurance market, such as demand and supply scarcity, imperfect insurance policy and so on.
To solve these problems is one of the main subjects in the field of forestry research currently.
2. Forest Insurance Research Review
According to the search results from the database like Engineering Village, Web of Science,
Springer and ProQuest by using “Forestry Insurance” and “Forest Insurance”, the research on
forest insurance has received wide attention from many scholars.
In  USA,  the  research  on forest  insurance  started relatively  early.  Brown (1928)  and  Kaul
(1928) took the leading in studying the forest fire insurance, and both articles concluded that
the high premiums offered by insurance companies were not attractive for owners. Shepard
(1937a, 1937b) was also a pioneer in this research area. Shepard (1950) noted the conditions
under which standing timber can be insured at a reasonable cost and discussed the possibility
that forest fire insurance could be organized on a mutual basis.
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In Sweden, forest insurance has been implemented for decades, and there are two kinds of
forest insurances: against all risks and fire insurance (Angstrom, 1982). In Spain, some forest
insurance programmes have appeared over the last few decades (Barreal, Loureiro & Picos,
2014). As a case study of a forest enterprise in southwest Germany, Holecy and Hanewinkel
(2006) set up a forest insurance model that can serve as a basis to calculate risk premiums to
insure the risk of forest destruction.
However,  in  fact  the  purchase  of  insurance  policy  by  forest  owners  is  still  an  exception
(Brunette,  Holecy,  Sedliak,  Tucek  &  Hanewinkel,  2015).  In  Spain,  among  the  6,224,029
hectares of insurable forest lands in 2010, only 77,103 hectares were insured against fire, i.e.,
1.25% (Barreal et al.,  2014). In Germany, forest insurance is in its very beginning stages
(Holecy & Hanewinkel, 2006).
Forest  insurance  is  an  effective  policy  to  increase  the  net  present  value  (NPV)  of  forest
investments, and it  has positive implications for the landowner and society (Barreal et al.,
2014). Some aspects of forest insurance research have been carried out recently, such as the
perception of risk of private forest owners (Blennow & Sallnas, 2002), the role that forest
products play in the famers’ self-insurance (McSweeney, 2004；McSweeney, 2005) and so on.
According to the existing research above, we can see that almost all the research focus on only
one aspect or two. In fact, in the forest insurance market there are three main participants: 
• the insurance company as the provider;
• the forest farmer or enterprise as the demand side;
• the government. 
As different participant has different benefit object, the forest farmer or enterprise hopes to
get lower insurance premium, on the contrary the insurance company tends to provide higher
insurance premium in most cases. In order to balance the benefit of all participants in the
forest insurance market, the government will play an important role in this situation. And there
will be a complex and dynamic game relationship among all participants, including the forest
farmer or enterprise, the insurance company and the government.
In this paper, the tripartite dynamic game model will be set up to make the relationship among
all participants in the forest insurance market clearly. The tripartite game model has been used
in many fields, such as Chinese coal industry (Chen, Feng & Cao, 2014), the price war of
telecommunications in China (Wan, Wu & Lin, 2013) and so on. Thus using the tripartite game
model to analyze such complex relationships among all participants in forest insurance market
will be a good way.
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3. The Game Relationship between the Insurance Company and the Forest Farmer
As the provider, the insurance company can affect the forest farmer’s purchasing behavior by
adjusting insurance premium. To make the game relationship clear, the static game model
between the insurance company and the forest farmer is set up.
Hypotheses are as follows:
• The forest farmer’s initial funding: W;
• The probability of forest risk: a;
• The forest farmer’s loss when the risks occur: L;
• The compensation to the forest farmer when disasters occur: I;
• The forest insurance premium: p;
• The business cost of the insurance company to implement forest insurance: K;
• The  expected  return  of  the  forest  farmer  U,  the  expected  return  of  the  insurance
company: V.
According to the hypotheses, the expected return of the forest farmer by purchasing the forest
insurance is: 
Uo = a(W - p - L + I)+(1 - a)(W - p) (1)
If the forest farmer doesn’t purchase the forest insurance, the expected return is:
U1 = a(W - L)+(1 - a)W (2)
The expected return of the insurance company in forest insurance market is:
V = a(p - I)+(1 - a)p - K (3)
Game matrix between the insurance company and the forest farmer is shown as Table 2.
 
Insurance company
quote Don’t quote
forest 
farmer
 insure U0 ,V U1 , 0
Don’t insure U1 , -K U1 , 0
Table 2. Game between the insurance company and the forest farmer
In Table 2, if you want to make (insure, quote) the equilibrium solution, you must make sure
that U0 > U1 and V > 0.
-1537-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1550
That is
a(W - p - L + I)+(1 - a)(W - p) > a(W - L)+(1 - a)W (4)
And
V = a(p - I)+(1 - a)p - K > 0 (5)
From the formula (4), we know that aI -p > 0, that is a > p
I
.
From the formula (5), we know that p - aI - K > 0, that is a < p−K
I
≤ p
I
.
From the results above, we find that the insurance company’s optimal strategy is conflicted
with the forest farmer. From the forest farmer’s point of view, only when the probability of
forest risk larger than the rate of insurance premium, they will choose to insure. On the other
side, only when the rate of insurance premium larger than the probability of forest risk, the
insurance company will quote. In fact, in order to get more profit, the insurance company will
set a high insurance premium. However, because of the lower income and weaker awareness
of risk, the forest farmer tends to refuse the forest insurance at a high insurance premium. So
the equilibrium solution will be (don’t insure, don’t quote).
4.  The  Tripartite  Dynamic  Game  Model  among  the  Government,  the  Insurance
Company and the Forest Farmer
According  to  the  analysis  above,  it’s  difficult  to  implement  forest  insurance  without  the
government, and the government will play a very important role in forest insurance market. In
this  part,  we  will  set  up  a  tripartite  dynamic  game  model  among  the  government,  the
insurance company and the forest farmer to deeply study the complex relationship among
them in forest insurance market.
Hypotheses are given as follows:
• Participants  in  the  game:  the  government,  the  insurance  company  and  the  forest
farmer.
• The sequential game actions: Firstly, the government will determine whether to provide
the forest  insurance allowance or not.  Secondly,  the insurance company will  decide
whether to participate in the forest insurance market actively. Finally, the forest farmer
will decide whether to purchase the forest insurance.
• The participants’ action space: for the government, it is to provide the forest insurance
allowance or not; for the insurance company, it is to implement the forest insurance
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actively  or  do  that  negatively;  for  the  forest  farmer,  it  is  to  purchase  the  forest
insurance or not.
• The government:
1. Rate of providing allowance: P, rate of not providing allowance: 1-P;
2. Cost of providing allowance: B;
3. Allowance for the forest farmer when provide allowance: T1;
4. Allowance for the insurance company when provide allowance: T2;
5. Economic benefits when the forest farmer purchases forest insurance: F1;
6. Environmental benefits when the forest farmer purchases forest insurance:
E1;
7. Economic loss when the forest farmer doesn’t purchase forest insurance: F2;
8. Environmental loss when the forest farmer doesn’t purchase forest insurance:
E2.
• The insurance company:
1. Rate  of  implementing  forest  insurance  actively:  q;  rate  of  implementing
negatively: 1-q;
2. Cost of implementing forest insurance actively: K1;
3. Cost of implementing negatively: K2;
4. Benefits from the forest insurance market: M;
5. Compensation pay-outs when disasters occur: R;
6. Allowance from the government: T2.
• The forest farmer:
1. Rate  of  purchasing  forest  insurance:  r;  rate  of  no  purchasing  forest
insurance: 1-r;
2. Benefits of purchasing forest insurance: I;
3. Cost of purchasing forest insurance: C;
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4. Benefits of no purchasing forest insurance: I’;
5. Cost of no purchasing forest insurance: C’;
6. Allowance from the government: T1.
From the description of game sequence and game relationship above, we can get a game tree
of participants shown as Figure 1.
Figure 1. Game tree of participants
In Figure 1, the nodes are expressed by numbers from 1 to 8, meaning eight different game
situations  in  the  forest  insurance  market.  Note  1  represents  the  situation  when  the
government  provides  insurance  allowance;  the  insurance  company  implements  forest
insurance actively, and the forest farmer purchases forest insurance. Note 2 represents the
situation  when  the  government  provides  insurance  allowance;  the  insurance  company
implements forest insurance actively, but the forest farmer doesn’t purchase forest insurance.
Note  3  represents  the  situation  when  the  government  provides  insurance  allowance;  the
insurance company implements forest insurance negatively, and the forest farmer purchases
forest insurance. Note 4 represents the situation when the government provides insurance
allowance;  the  insurance  company  implements  forest  insurance  negatively,  but  the  forest
farmer doesn’t purchase forest insurance. From note 5 to note 8, the forest farmer and the
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insurance company’s behaviors are the same as note 1 to note 4 correspondingly, except that
the government doesn’t provide allowance.
We can get a payoff matrix of participants from eight notes shown as Table 3.
Sequence
number payoff matrix
1 [I-C+T1 , M-R-K1+T2 , E1+F1-B-T1-T2]
2 [I’-C’ , T2-K1 , -E2-F2-B-T2]
3 [I-C+T1+T2 , M-R-K2 , E1+F1-B-T1-T2]
4 [I’-C’ , - K2 , -E2-F2-B]
5 [I-C , M-R-K1 , E1+F1]
6 [I’-C’ , -K1 , -E2-F2]
7 [I-C , M-R-K2 , E1+F1]
8 [I’-C’ , -K2 , -E2-F2]
Table 3. Payoff matrix of participants
In Table 3, the first row is the forest farmer’s payoff function, the second row is the insurance
company’s payoff function and the third one is the government’s payoff function. The sequence
numbers from 1 to 8 in Figure 1 are relating to the payoff matrix in Table 3 with the same
sequence  number.  For  example,  the  payoff  matrix  [I-C+T1,  M-R-K1+T2,  E1+F1-B-T1-T2],
whose sequence number is 1 in Table 3, can be explained like this: under the situation when
the  government  provides  insurance  allowance;  the  insurance  company  implements  forest
insurance actively and the forest farmer purchases forest insurance, the forest farmer’s payoff
matrix is I-C+T1 , the insurance company’s payoff matrix is M-R-K1+T2 and the government’s
payoff matrix is E1+F1-B-T1-T2. The rest notes from 2 to 8 can be done in the same manner.
The equilibrium solution of the dynamic game model is as follows:
• The forest farmer’s payoff function:
e1=pqr(I-C-T1)+pq(1-r)(I'-C')+p(1-q)r(I-C+T1+T2)+p(1-q)(1-r)(I'-C')+(1-p)qr(I-C)+(1-
p)q(1-r)(I'-C')+(1-p)(1-q)r(I-C)+(1-p)(1-q)(1-r)(I'-C')
That is e1=prT2-pqrT2+prT1+rI-rC+I'-rI'-C'+rC'.
To maximize the forest farmer’ payoff function, that is
e1
 r
=0 and pT2-pqT2+pT1+I-C+I'-
I'-C'=0, thus,
q✳=
(I−C )−(I '−C ')+pT 2+pT 1
pT 2
(6)
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• The insurance company’s payoff function:
e2=pqr(M-R-K1+T2)+pq(1-r)(T2-K1)+p(1-q)r(M-R-K2)+p(1-q)(1-r)(-k2)+(1-p)qr(M-R-
K1)+(1-p)q(1-r)(-K1)+(1-p)(1-q)r(M-R-K2)+(1-p)(1-q)(1-r)(-K2)
That is e2=pqT2-qK1+rM-rR-K2+qK2.
To maximize the insurance company’ payoff function, that is
e2
q
=0 and  pT2-K1+K2=0,
thus,
p✳=
K 1−K 2
T 2
(7)
• The government’s payoff function:
e3=pqr(E1+F1-B-T1-T2)+pq(1-r)(-E2-F2-B-T2)+p(1-q)r(E1+F1-B-T1-T2)+p(1-q)(1-r)(-E2-F2-
B)+(1-p)qr(E1+F1)+(1-p)q(1-r)(-E2-F2)+(1-p)(1-q)r(E1+F1)+(1-p)(1-q)(1-r)(-E2-F2)
That is e3=-pB+rE1+rF1-E2-F2+rE2+rF2-pqT2+pqrT2-prT1-prT2.
To maximize the government’ payoff function, that is
e3
 p
=0 and -B-qT2+qrT2-rT1-rT2=0,
thus,
r✳=
B+qT 2
qT 2−T 1−T 2
(8)
From formula (7) and (6), we know that: q✳=(I−C )−(I '−C ')
K 1−K 2
+
T 1+T 2
T 2
.
From formula (7) and (8), we know that: r ✳=
(K2−K 1)(B+T 2+T 1)
(I '−C ')−(I−C )
+1 .
Thus, the equilibrium solution of the tripartite dynamic game model is:
p✳ ,q✳ ,r✳=[
K1−K 2
T 2
, (I−C )−(I '−C ')
K 1−K 2
+
T 1+T 2
T 2
,
(K2−K 1)(B+T 2+T 1)
(I '−C ')−(I−C )
+1] .
According  to  the  equilibrium solution  of  the  tripartite  dynamic  game model,  the  behavior
characteristics of the government, the insurance company and the forest farmer are as follows:
• The intention of the government to provide the forest insurance allowance depends on
the amount of allowance to the insurance company and the cost of insurance company
implementing forest insurance. The cost of insurance company implementing the forest
insurance actively is higher, and the amount of allowance is fewer, then the government
tends to provide the forest insurance allowance more.
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• Whether the insurance company implements forest insurance actively or not, that is
determined by the cost of implementing forest insurance, benefits and cost of the forest
farmer and the amount of allowance from the government. Benefits of the forest farmer
by  purchasing  forest  insurance  is  more,  the  cost  of  the  insurance  company
implementing forest insurance actively is lower, and the allowance from the government
is more, then the insurance company will be more likely to implement forest insurance
actively.
• The forest farmer’s intention of purchasing forest insurance is related to all participants’
behaviors. The cost of the insurance company implementing forest insurance actively is
lower,  the  allowance  from  the  government  is  more,  benefits  of  the  forest  farmer
purchasing forest insurance is more, then the forest farmer will tend to purchase the
forest insurance more. 
5. Conclusions
In forest insurance market, there are three main participants including the insurance company,
the  forest  farmer  and  the  government.  The  insurance  company  is  the  provider  of  forest
insurance, and the forest farmer is the forest insurance demander. In general, the price is
decided by the supply and the demand in market. If the supply is short, the price will increase;
if the demand is short, the price will decrease. In fact, in forest insurance market both the
supply and the demand are short. Some studies have shown that it is difficult for the insurance
company to implement forest insurance at a low cost (Manley & Watt, 2009), and also shown
that  the  larger  the  insured  area  is,  the  lower  the  insurance  premium will  be  (Holecy  &
Hanewinkel,  2006;  Pinheiro  &  Ribeiro,  2013).  That  is  to  say,  the  more  widely  the  forest
insurance implementation is, the lower insurance premium will be.
However,  at  the  beginning  of  the  forest  insurance  implementation,  the  scope  of  forest
insurance implementation is limited. In this situation, the insurance company has to set a
higher insurance premium to guarantee profits, and it will expel the forest farmer from the
forest  insurance market.  Thus,  in  the beginning of forest  insurance market,  the insurance
company and the forest farmer will  have inconsistent expectations for the forest insurance
premium. If the insurance premium is set directly by demand and the supply in this period, the
forest insurance market will shrink.
However, natural disasters are unfavorable factors for the sustainable development of forestry.
Take an example of wildfires, wildfires can cause significant damage to both the forest stand
and soil quality, whilst the affected growing stocks may take a long time to recover (Inbar,
Wittenberg & Tamir, 1997). The forest restoration is expensive for landowners, who may be
interested in covering wildfires losses with insurance in exchange for the payment of proper
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insurance premium. The creation of proper incentives for landowners to increase the use and
penetration of insurance markets in forestry (Amacher, Malik & Haight, 2006) can become a
significant tool to fight additional costs imposed by the occurrence of natural disasters.
In fact, to lower insurance premium is an effective way to attract more forest farmers to enter
the  forest  insurance  market.  Thus  in  order  to  expand  the  forest  insurance  market,  the
government’s  allowance  will  be  an  important  positive  factor.  The  loss  of  the  insurance
company, which the low insurance premium brings, can be compensated by the allowance from
the government. And the forest farmer can also get the allowance from the government, which
will reduce the economic burden of the forest farmer on purchasing the forest insurance. The
more  the  government  provides  allowance,  the  more  actively  the  insurance  company  will
implement forest insurance at a low insurance premium. In this situation, the forest farmer will
be  more  likely  to  purchase  the  forest  insurance,  then  the  scope  of  forest  insurance
implementation will expend.
Acknowledgments
Beijing Higher Education Young Elite Teacher Project (No.YETP0777), Humanities and Social
Sciences  Planning  Fund  Supported  by  Chinese  Ministry  of  Education  (No.12YJAZH090),
Program of Study Abroad for Young Scholar sponsored by China Scholarship Council.
References
Amacher, G., Malik, A., & Haight, R. (2006). Reducing social losses from forest fires.  Land
Econ., 82, 367-383. http://dx.doi.org/10.3368/le.82.3.367 
Angstrom,  A.  (1982).  Forest  insurance  in  Sweden.  Forest  Fire  Prevention  and  Control, 7,
223-227. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-1574-4_26 
Barreal,  J.,  Loureiro,  M.L.,  &  Picos,  J.  (2014).  On insurance  as  a  tool  for  securing  forest
restoration  after  wildfires.  Forest  Policy  and  Economics,  42,  15-23.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2014.02.001 
Blennow, K., & Sallnas, O. (2002). Risk perception among non-industrial private forest owners.
Scandinavian  Journal  of  Forest  Research,  17(5),  472-479.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/028275802320435487 
Bonan, G. (2008). Forests and climate change: Forcings, feedbacks, and the climate benefits of
forests. Science, 320, 1444-1449. http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1155121 
Brown, W.R. (1928). Forest fire actuary. Journal of Forestry, 26(1), 88-90.
-1544-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1550
Brunette, M., Holecy, J., Sedliak, M., Tucek, J., & Hanewinkel, M. (2015). An actuarial model of
forest insurance against multiple natural hazards in fir (Abies Alba Mill.) stands in Slovakia.
Forest Policy and Economics, 55, 46-57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2015.03.001 
Chen, H., Feng, Q., & Cao, J. (2014). Rent-seeking mechanism for safety supervision in the
Chinese  coal  industry  based  on  a  tripartite  game  model.  Energy  Policy,  72,  140-145.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.04.017 
Dai, Y., Chang, H.H., & Liu, W. (2015). Do forest producers benefit from the forest disaster
insurance  program?  Empirical  evidence  in  Fujian  Province  of  China.  Forest  Policy  and
Economics, 50, 127-133. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2014.06.001 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). (1999). State of the world’s forests. FAO, Rome, 154.
Holecy,  J.,  &  Hanewinkel,  M.  (2006).  A  forest  management  risk  insurance  model  and  its
application  to  coniferous  stands in  southwest Germany.  Forest  Policy and Economics,  8,
161-174. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.forpol.2004.05.009 
Inbar, M., Wittenberg, L.,  & Tamir,  M. (1997). Soil erosion and forestry management after
wildfire in a Mediterranean Woodland, Mt. Carmel, Israel. Int. J. Wild land Fire, 7,285-294.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/WF9970285 
Kaul,  J.  (1928). Report of Committee on Forest Fire Insurance of the Commercial  Forestry
Conference. Journal of Forestry, 26(1), 76-84.
Koch,  P.  (1992).  Wood  versus  non-wood  materials  in  U.S.  residential  construction:  Some
energy-related global implications. Forest Products Journal, 42(5), 31-42.
Manley, B., & Watt, R. (2009).  Forestry insurance, risk pooling and risk mitigation options.
Report prepared for MAF Project CM-09 under MAF POL, 0809-11194.
McSweeney,  K.  (2004).  Forest  product  sale as natural  insurance: the effects  of  household
characteristics and the nature of shock in eastern Honduras. Society and Natural Resources,
17(1), 39-56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08941920490247245 
McSweeney, K. (2005). Natural insurance, forest access, and compounded misfortune: Forest
resources in smallholder coping strategies before and after Hurricane Mitch, northeastern
Honduras. World Development, 33(9), 1453-1471. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2004.10.008 
Nzunda,  E.F.  (2012).  Discrepancies  between  targets  and  achievements  in  industrial  forest
production  and  export  in  Tanzania. Forestry  Studies  in  China, 14(3),  210-215.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11632-012-0307-y 
-1545-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1550
Pinheiro, A.,  & Ribeiro, N. (2013). Forest property insurance: an application to Portuguese
woodlands. Int. J. Sustain. Soc, 5(3), 284-295. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/IJSSOC.2013.054716 
Qin, Y., Xiao, X., Dong, J., Zhang, G., Shimada, M., Liu, J., et al. (2015). Forest cover maps of
China in 2010 from multiple approaches and data sources: PALSAR, Landsat, MODIS, FRA,
and  NFI.  ISPRS  Journal  of  Photogrammetry  and  Remote  Sensing,  Nov,  1-16.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.isprsjprs.2015.08.010 
Shepard, H.B. (1937a). Forest fire insurance in the pacific coast states. Technical Bulletins,
33(2), 111-116.
Shepard, H.B. (1937b). Fire insurance for forests. Journal of Land & Public Utility Economics,
13(2), 111-115. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3158703 
Shepard, H.B. (1950). Comment on forest fire insurance. Journal of Forestry, 48(8), 348-350.
State Forestry Administration of China (2012).  Development Report of Chinese Forestry in
2012. Beijing: China Forestry Press (in Chinese).
Wan, X.Y., Wu, J., & Lin, X. (2013). Tripartite dynamic game model with incomplete information
in  telecommunications  regulated  by  government.  Management  Science  &  Engineering
(ICMSE), 2013 International Conference on (20, 2282-2288). IEEE.
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2015 (www.jiem.org)
Article's contents are provided on an Attribution-Non Commercial 3.0 Creative commons license. Readers are allowed to copy, distribute
and communicate article's contents, provided the author's and Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management's names are included.
It must not be used for commercial purposes. To see the complete license contents, please visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
-1546-
